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Abstract Changing the income tax progressivity in labour markets with collective
wage bargaining generates a trade-off. On the one hand, higher progressivity distorts
individual labour supply decisions at the hours-of-work margin, on the other hand,
it reduces unemployment by exerting downward pressure on wages. This trade-off is
quantitatively assessed using a numerical model for Germany. The model combines
a microsimulation module, which captures the labour-supply decisions of approxi-
mately 4,600 individual households, and a macro (computable general equilibrium)
module, which features collective wage bargaining and involuntary unemployment.
Inthe simulations carried out usingthis model, the optimal degree of taxprogressivity
turns out to be higher than the one in the actual German tax schedule. The optimum is
located at marginal tax rates that are 6percentage points higher than the actual rates
(combined with a transfer that balances the public budget). The welfare gain from
such a reform is modest, however. It amounts to no more than two euros per person
per month.
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1 Introduction
When we analyse the economic effects of income tax progressivity, obtaining a full
picture is only possible if we take account of three different effects. First, tax progres-
sivity is a means of redistribution, because average tax rates are higher for the rich
than for the poor. Second, the higher the marginal tax rates, the higher the distortion-
ary effects on individual labour supply decisions. Third, tax progressivity changes the
conditions for collective wage bargaining and affects the level of wages and unem-
ployment. In this paper I present an applied simulation model for Germany, which
allows for an integrated analysis of these effects possible and enables us to derive the
optimal degree of tax progressivity.
In the policy debate, the redistributive effect of income tax progressivity is clearly
dominating, whereas economists have traditionally emphasised the efﬁciency aspect.
Ahighdegreeoftaxprogressivitymeanshighmarginaltaxrates,withtheconsequence
of large labour supply distortions and a decreasing overall scope for redistribution.
Mirrlees (1971) was the ﬁrst to derive criteria for an optimal tax schedule, which
balances redistributive and distortionary effects (see Tuomala (1990) for a compre-
hensive overview of the literature based on the Mirrlees approach). When translating
these criteria into a realistically quantiﬁed tax schedule we are, however, confronted
with three major problems. (1) Labour supply is not only ﬂexible at the hours-of-work
margin, but also at the participation margin (this has been addressed by Saez 2002).
(2) The income tax system covers households of varying composition, which leads to
incommensurable utility functions. (3) Individuals are not only heterogeneous with
respect to their earnings potential (as assumed by Mirrlees), but also with respect to
their leisure preferences, which also makes them difﬁcult to compare.
These complications have led to the evolution of a second approach, which takes
household heterogeneity seriously in several dimensions and is less concerned with
the derivation of analytic optimality conditions. This approach is rooted in the tradi-
tion of econometric labour supply estimation and microsimulation (Fortin et al. 1993;
Aaberge and Colombino 2008; Ericson and Floot 2009). The increase in complexity
caused by introducing ﬂexible functional forms for the estimation of utility functions
comes at the expense of ﬂexibility in the tax schedule. Rather than deriving local mar-
ginal optimality conditions (as in Mirrlees 1971), the search for an optimal system
is restricted to a relatively small set of free parameters (e.g. stepwise constant mar-
ginal tax rates). Bourguignon and Spadaro (2005) can be placed in this tradition as
well. They invert the problem, however, and ask which social welfare function would
produce the existing tax schedule as an optimal choice.
Bothapproachesdescribedaboveremainwithinapartiallabourmarketframework:
wages are ﬁxed and there is no involuntary unemployment. Since the 1980s, however,
extensive research into non-competitive labour markets has shown that tax progres-
sivity has important effects on wage formation as well (Hersoug 1984; Lockwood and
Manning1993;HolmlundandKolm1995;KoskelaandVilmunen1996).Taxprogres-
sivity lowers the incentives for high wage claims and leads to a downward pressure
on non-competitive wages, which in turn reduces involuntary unemployment.
Few attempts have been made to quantify the trade-off between the positive effect
of tax progressivity on wage formation and its negative effect on labour supply
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(Holmlund and Kolm 1995; Sørensen 1999; Boeters 2011). These attempts remain
within an aggregate representative-agent approach and do not combine non-compet-
itive wage formation and the heterogeneity of individual households. This is where
the present paper comes into play. I use a consistent micro-macro simulation set-up
developed during the past few years (Böhringer et al. 2005; Arntz et al. 2008; Boeters
andFeil2009).Inthemicrosimulationpart,themodelfeaturesadiscretelaboursupply
choice,wheretheparametersoftheutilityfunctionareestimatedalongthelinesofvan
Soest (1995). The computable general equilibrium (CGE) part features sectoral wage
bargainingbetweentradeunionsandemployers’organisations,whichresultsinwages
that are above the market-clearing level, and thus leads to involuntary unemployment.
In this paper I use this micro-macro set-up to determine optimal tax progressiv-
ity.Performingcounterfactual experiments withsystematicallyvarying taxschedules,
I ﬁnd an optimal tax schedule with marginal tax rates that are a few percentage points
higher than the ones in the initial situation. This benchmark optimum is determined
without any welfare weighting, according to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of potential
compensation of the losers. Adding redistributive motives to the social welfare func-
tion would drive the results towards even higher tax progressivity.
The simulations also show that the welfare function is relatively ﬂat around the
optimum. The welfare gain of a switch from the initial to the optimal point is no more
than 2 euros per person per month. In addition, the maximum point reacts sensitively
to assumptions about core parameters. In the sensitivity analysis it is shown that the
level of optimal tax progressivity is increased by a lower elasticity of labour supply,
by higher wage curve elasticity and by higher international capital mobility.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, the two modules of the
model—micro and macro—and their linkage are presented. Section 3 describes the
welfare calculations and Sect. 4 the scenarios to be implemented. Section 5 presents
the main simulation results, followed by Sect. 6 with the sensitivity analysis. Sec-
tion 7 summarises and concludes. The Appendix contains details of the labour supply
estimation that underlie the microsimulation module.
2 Simulation Set-up
The model used in this paper to perform a numerical analysis of tax progressivity
is based on an integrated micro-macro set-up. The micro part of the model consists
of a discrete choice (DC) labour supply module with heterogeneous households. The
macro part is a multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of an
open economy with collective wage bargaining. The two parts are ﬁrst presented sep-
aratelyinSect.2.1and2.2.InSect.2.3,Iturntothemicro-macrolinkageanddescribe
how consistent feedback loops are constructed. Arntz et al. (2008) provides a more
extensive discussion of the linked model.
2.1 Microsimulation of Labour Supply
AtthebasisofthelaboursupplymoduleisthemicrosimulationmodelforGermanyby
Buslei and Steiner (1999). This model combines a household income calculator under
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the current German tax and transfer system and a DC labour supply estimation of the
van Soest (1995) type. Discrete labour supply options (which combine the respective
amounts of income and leisure) for all households are constructed using information
from the German Socio-Economic Panel, GSOEP (see Table 3 in the Appendix).
In the DC setup, the utility of labour-supply option k for household j of type i is a
combination of a deterministic part, ¯ U, which depends on a vector of individual and
alternative-speciﬁc characteristics, x j,k, and an additive stochastic error term, εj,k:
Ui(x j,k) = ¯ Ui(x j,k) + εj,k.
The distinctive feature of the logit approach is that the error term is assumed to be
independently standard extreme-value distributed. This makes it possible to derive an
explicit formula for the probability of preferring option k over all other options l  = k
from a set m (McFadden 1974):
P(Ui(x j,k)>Ui(x j,l)) =
exp( ¯ Ui(x j,k))

m exp( ¯ Ui(x j,m))
, ∀l  = k
Following van Soest (1995), the utility function ¯ Ui is speciﬁed as a translog function
with coefﬁcients Ai and βi, which capture the quadratic and linear terms respectively:
¯ Ui(x j,k) = x 
j,kAix j,k + β 
ix j,k.
Each option is characterised by the logs of disposable income and weekly hours of
leisure for men and women:
x j,k = (log(Ci(h
f
j,k,hm
j,k)),log(T − h
f
j,k),log(T − hm
j,k)),
where h f and hm are the working hours of the spouses and T is time endowment. The
coefﬁcients Ai and βi include interactions between leisure, income and a number of
household characteristics. Fixed costs of working are captured by constant terms for
speciﬁc labour-supply options. The coefﬁcients are estimated separately for couples,
female singles and male singles from a sample of approximately 4,600 GSOEP indi-
viduals (see Table 4 in Appendix A.1). A complete list of regressors and the detailed
estimation results can be found in Appendix A.2.
Giventheestimationresults,simulationofacounterfactualsituationproceedsalong
the lines of Duncan and Weeks (1998) and Creedy and Kalb (2005). Random num-
bers are drawn from the extreme-value distribution, and only those consistent with the
actual choice of the respective household are retained. In the subsequent simulation,
withchangeddisposableincomesfortheindividuallaboursupplyoptions,theoptimal
choice will change for a subset of these random numbers. In the initial situation, each
household chooses exactly one option, whereas in the post-reform situation, we may
end up with a genuine probability distribution over all options.
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2.2 The CGE Framework
The labour supply module is embedded in a computable general equilibrium model of
Germany(“PACE-L”).Inthissection,themainpartsofthemodelarebrieﬂysketched.
An extensive, algebraic model description and a summary of the data sources used for
calibration can be found in Böhringer et al. (2005).1
Private Households
The model comprises three representative worker households, each representing the
aggregate labour supply of one skill type in the microsimulation module. This cov-
ers all households with ﬂexible time allocation and observable hours of work, which
constitute roughly 60% of total labour supply. The rest is captured by one residual
workerhouseholdwithﬁxedlaboursupply.Finally,thereisaseparatecapitalisthouse-
hold, which receives all capital income and decides on consumption and investment
according to the approach of Ballard et al. (1985). The utility function of the capitalist
household is calibrated to empirical saving elasticities. Worker households, in con-
trast, do not save. The structure of consumption is assumed to be identical across all
households.
Firms
In each of seven aggregate production sectors, a representative ﬁrm produces a homo-
geneous output. The production functions are of the nested constant-elasticity-of-sub-
stitution (CES) type, combining intermediate inputs, capital and labour of the three
skill types. For the value-added nest, we adopt the NNCES approach of Perroni and
Rutherford (1995), which allows us to calibrate labour demand elasticities to the set
of estimated cross-price effects in Falk and Koebel (1997).2 Each individual ﬁrm is
assumed to be small in relation to its respective sector. All ﬁrms in one sector interact
throughmonopolisticcompetition,sothatﬁrmscanexploitmarketpowerintheirindi-
vidual market segment. Cost minimisation yields demand functions for the primary
factors of production and intermediate demand at the sectoral level. Capital is mobile
across sectors, and the domestic market for capital is perfectly competitive. Interna-
tionalcapitalmobilityisimperfect.(SeeSect.6.3forasensitivityanalysiswithrespect
to international capital supply.)
Wage Formation
In the largest part of the labour market, i.e. the low- and medium-skilled seg-
ments, wages are determined by sector- and skill-group-speciﬁc negotiations between
employers’ associations and trade unions. The bargaining outcome is generated
1 An updated, complete model description is available upon request.
2 The extension of the model to three skill groups with NNCES calibration is described in Boeters and Feil
(2009).
123452 S. Boeters
through the maximisation of a Nash function, which includes the objective func-
tions of both parties and their respective fallback options. In the model, the “right
to manage” approach is adopted: Parties bargain over wages, and ﬁrms determine
labour demand on the basis of the bargained wage. The objective function of the trade
unions is of the “insider” type: value of a job minus value of the outside option. The
latter in turn is composed of two components, associated with the chances of ﬁnd-
ing a job in another sector or remaining unemployed. The values of labour market
states are determined as weighted averages of incomes in the case of employment
and unemployment, where weights are computed from the probabilities of transition
between employment and unemployment (see Pissarides 1990, for an overview of
the search-and-matching approach). Collective wage bargaining results in wages that
are above the market-clearing level, with involuntary unemployment as the conse-
quence.
Incontrasttothelow-andmedium-skilledsegments,thehigh-skilledlabourmarket
is assumed to be competitive, and there is no involuntary unemployment. Account-
ing for unemployment, the three labour markets are balanced by aggregating, on the
demand side, over sectors and, on the supply side, over households of the respective
skill type. With respect to other household characteristics apart from the skill type, it
is assumed that the structure of labour demand is uniform across sectors.
Government
The main focus of the model is on the complex tax and transfer system for private
households, whose budget constraints are calculated in the microsimulation module
(see Sect. 2.1). Apart from labour income taxes, the government collects uniform cap-
italinputtaxes,proﬁttaxes,outputtaxesinproductionanddifferentiatedconsumption
taxes. The government budget encompasses the revenue from all these taxes, transfers
toprivatehouseholds,thepublicpurchasesofgoods,andthebalanceofpaymentssur-
plus or deficit. In the policy simulations (see Sect. 4), the level of public consumption
is kept constant and the transfers to private households are adjusted to ensure that the
public budget is in balance.
Foreign Trade
Accordingtothesmall-open-economyassumption,exportandimportpricesinforeign
currency are not affected by the domestic economy. International trade is modelled
adoptingtheArmington(1969)assumptionofproductheterogeneitybymarketofori-
gin and destination. Domestically produced goods are converted into speciﬁc goods
destined for the domestic market and the export market through a constant-elastic-
ity-of-transformation function. Analogously, a CES function characterises the choice
between imported and domestically produced varieties of the same good. The output
ofthisCESaggregationisusedbothasintermediateandﬁnaldemand.Foreignclosure
of the model is warranted through the balance-of-payments constraint.
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2.3 Linking the Microsimulation and CGE Modules
If we had a closed-form formula for individual labour supply, it would in principle be
possibletointegrateallequationsofthetwomodulesinasinglemodelandtrytosolve
it simultaneously. However, as labour supply is simulated with random numbers (see
Sect. 2.1), the modules must be kept separate and iterated until they produce a consis-
tentsolution.Inthepolicysimulations(Sect.5)Istartwiththemodiﬁedrulesofthetax
and transfer system and ﬁrst simulate labour supply changes under the assumption of
constantwagesandunemploymentrates.Theresultinglaboursupplyisaggregatedby
skill type and transferred to the CGE module, which is then solved under the assump-
tion of a ﬁxed labour supply. This results in changes in wages, unemployment rates
and transfers to balance the public budget. These variables are fed back to the labour
supplymoduleforthenextiteration.Thisiscontinueduntilthetwomodulesconverge.
When linking the wage bargaining equations to the microsimulation module, it is
assumedthatallindividualhouseholds(oftherespectiveskillgroup)areuniformlyrep-
resentedbythetradeunion.Marginaltaxratesandthevaluesofemploymentandunem-
ployment are calculated as (hours-weighted) averages over all households and labour
supplyoptions.Inturn,thewagesandunemploymentratesthatresultintheCGEmod-
uleareusedtoderivetheincomepositionsofallemployedorunemployedhouseholds.
3 Welfare Calculations
In previous applications (e.g. Boeters and Feil 2009), the micro-macro model has
been used only for a descriptive analysis, i.e. for tracing out the consequences of
policy changes for observable economic variables, without any sort of welfare assess-
ment. For the present analysis, the model needs to be extended with a welfare module.
For this purpose, I draw on the work of Creedy and Kalb (2005), adjusted for the fact
that utility of the households is conceptualised as an expected value.
It has been shown in Sect. 2.1 that the utility function is translog with household
consumption and leisure as arguments. Expected utility, EU, of labour supply option
k for household j of type i is the probability-weighted (pi,n) sum over the utilities in
the different labour market states n (employed/unemployed, i.e. two states for singles,
four for couples):
EUj,k =

n
pi,n

ai,C

log(Cj,k,n)
2 + ˜ βi,C log(Cj,k,n) + Rj,k

(1)
In contrast to Sect. 2.1, eq. (1) focuses only on the terms related to household con-
sumption. ai,C is the coefﬁcient of the quadratic log-consumption term, ˜ βi,C is the
coefﬁcient that collects all terms that are linear in log-consumption (including the
interaction terms with leisure), and Rj,k is a residual collecting all terms that do not
depend on consumption at all.3
3 There is no special treatment of unemployed individuals in the utility function. They simply receive
the maximum amount of leisure (contained in Rj,k) and unemployment beneﬁts as income. Discounting
123454 S. Boeters
In a discrete choice setting, the calculation of the Hicksian equivalent variation
(EV) is complicated by the fact that we do not know beforehand which labour-supply
option the household will choose. In the initial situation, household j chooses option
k, providing utility level EUj,k. In the counterfactual situation simulated, it chooses
l, providing utility level ¯ EU j,l. However, neither k nor l need be the option it would
choose if it were compensated lump-sum (the ﬁction underlying the EV calculation)
insteadofundergoingtheactualpolicychange.Therefore EVmustbecalculatedforall
possible options (index m). This is done using the following implicit formula for EV:
¯ EU j,l=

n
pi,n

ai,C

log(Ci,j,n + EVi,m,n)
2 + ˜ βi,C log(Ci,j,n + EVi,m,n)+ Ri,j

Under normal circumstances, option-speciﬁc EV will be constant across labour mar-
ket states (EVi,m,n = EVi,m, ∀n). However, a complication arises because for some
households, EV can be negative and larger (inabsolute terms) than their consumption
in the case of unemployment. This would make the log function undeﬁned. To avoid
this case, I set a lower bound on EVi,m,n, which is slightly above −Ci,j,n, and allow
EVi,m,n to deviate from the other options if it is at its lower bound.4
Individualequivalentvariationistheminimumoftheoption-speciﬁcvalues(Creedy
and Kalb 2005):
EVj = min
m (EVj,m)
Finally, the change in total welfare is calculated by summing up all individual EVs.
We can restrict ourselves to the individuals in the micro module, because all other
agents are compensated so that their welfare remains constant (see Sect. 4).
EV =

j
EVj
By taking the unweighted sum of the EVs as welfare measure, I adopt the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion of “potential compensation”. If total EV is positive, the winners of the
tax reform could compensate the losers. The principal caveat of this criterion is that
as long as no actual compensation takes place, distributional aspects do matter, but
are not accounted for. It would be desirable to apply some distributional weighting to
the EV changes, at least as a sensitivity analysis. However, this runs into the problem
thattheutilityfunctionsareinherentlyincommensurable,becausetheparametersvary
by household. Therefore, no straightforward basis for weighting is available. Aaberge
andColombino (2008)proposeaweightingmethodthatinvolvestwodivergingutility
functions per household. I do not adopt this approach in the present paper because of
the consistency problems implied.
Footnote 3 continued
involuntaryleisurewouldshiftthepolicytrade-offinthedirectionofmoreemployment.(SeeBoeters2011,
for the effects of discounting involuntary leisure in a representative agent model.)
4 In these cases the non-restricted value of EVi,m,n is selected for the welfare calculations. As only a few
households are affected, the overall welfare results are not sensitive to this assumption.
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Fig. 1 German income tax schedule (2005)
4 Scenario Definition
The scenarios for the simulation runs are set up as changes in the budget constraints
of the individual households, which are contained in the micro module of the linked
model. For each household and each labour supply option, the budget constraint is
characterised by the average burden and one or two marginal burdens (for single
and couple households respectively). These burdens summarise the complete tax and
transfer system, comprising the income tax, social security contributions and, possi-
bly, transfer payments. In the simulations, the conditions (though not the incidence)
of the latter are kept ﬁxed, while the income tax schedule is varied.
AccordingtotheGermanincometaxschedule,themarginaltaxrateisincreasingin
taxable income, with two different slope parameters up to a certain threshold income,
and constant thereafter. The average tax rate is monotonously increasing in taxable
incomeaswell,asymptoticallyapproachingthehighestmarginaltaxrateforveryhigh
incomes (see Fig. 1).
In the simulations, I gradually increase the progressivity of the tax schedule. The
marginal tax rate is raised by the same number of percentage points everywhere (shift
from “initial” to “scenario” in Fig. 1). To compensate the increase in tax income that
would result from an isolated increase in the marginal tax rates, I introduce a uniform
transfer paid to each working individual. These two changes are combined to a new
average tax schedule, which is ﬁrst below, then above the initial one. Figure 1 shows
the case of a 6 percentage-points increase of the marginal tax rates as “scenario”. This
is the change that turns out to be optimal in the base case simulations of Sect. 5.I nt h i s
scenario,thebudget-balancingtransferamountsto1,416eurosperyear(118eurosper
month).Withthistransferinplace,thereformisfavourableforsinglehouseholdswitha
taxableincomeofbelow30,000euros,whereashouseholdswithahigherincomelose.5
5 Here I assume that earnings do not change. They do change in the model, where wages are endogenous.
123456 S. Boeters
The welfare assessment in the scenarios is slightly complicated by the fact that the
workerhouseholdswithﬂexiblelaboursupplyarenottheonlyhouseholdsinthemodel
(see Sect. 2.2, “Private Households”). The residual worker household and the capi-
talist household are also affected by the reform, through changing wages and returns
to capital respectively. As utility functions that allow us to evaluate welfare changes
are only deﬁned for households in the microsimulation module, further adjustment
parameters are introduced to restrict welfare changes to this group. Lump-sum trans-
fersareadjustedinordertokeeprealincomeoftheresidualhouseholdspreciselyatits
initial value. When evaluating welfare changes, we can then focus on the households
in the microsimulation module when evaluating welfare changes.
5 Simulation Results
The simulation set-up described in Sect. 4 produces welfare effects that are concave
in tax progressivity. Welfare is maximised at marginal tax rates that are 6percentage
points above the initial level. Figure 2 shows the welfare proﬁle, Fig. 1 (“scenario”)
the tax schedule at the maximum point.
Figure 2 also illustrates that a relatively large number of random numbers is neces-
sary to produce a smooth shape of the curve. Curves with 100 random error terms per
individual (broken lines) show a lot of non-concave segments and are volatile. Only
with 1,000 random numbers (the average of the 10 cases with 100 numbers shown in
bold), is the curve sufﬁciently smooth for a single, global maximum to be discerned.
Even in the case of 1,000 random numbers, perfect concavity is not reached yet, and
we had better describe the welfare maximum as being somewhere between a 5- and
an 8-percentage-point increase of the marginal tax rates.
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The aggregate equivalent variation (EV) reached in this region is approximately
500 million euros per year. Given that the microsimulation module represents roughly
21 million people, this amounts to 24 euros per person per year, or 2 euros per month.
This is a small amount compared to the redistribution that is taking place at the same
time. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the welfare effects across households at the
maximum point (where marginal tax rates are 6percentage points higher). There is
a large variation with EV ranging from a loss of more than 300 euros to a gain of
almost 200 euros. The distribution is skewed, the tail with the losses is thicker, and the
median is at approximately 18 euros, considerably more than the average of 2 euros.
Is it possible to identify the model mechanisms that are responsible for the average
welfaregainontopofalltheredistributionthatistakingplace?Letuslookatanumber
of model outcomes in order to get a feeling for what drives the results. To begin with,
Fig. 4 shows the changes in labour supply (total hours, i.e. both at the intensive and
extensive margin).
Thelaboursupplyeffectsdifferqualitativelyacrossskillgroups.Forthelowskilled,
labour supply increases with the degree of tax progressivity, for the medium skilled it
decreasesslightly,forthehighskilledconsiderablyso.Thereactionofeachskillgroup
is almost linear. For comparison the curves with the addition “linear” extrapolate the
effect of the ﬁrst percentage point change linearly. For all skill groups the deviation
fromthelinearcurveisnegative,i.e.withhighprogressivitythereisamorethanlinear
disincentive to work. We will see that this is the driving force behind the results; but
to obtain a clear picture, we continue our analysis of the results.
Next, we break the labour supply effects down into changes along the hours-of-
work and the participation margins (Figs. 5, 6). Hours of work decrease for all skill
groups, the differences between skill groups are small and the deviations from the
linearresponsesarenotuniform.Participationincreasesforallgroups,thedifferences
among groups are considerably larger than for hours of work, and the deviations from
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Fig. 4 Labour supply by skill group
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Fig. 5 Hours-of-work effects by skill group
the linear schedule are always negative. For the low skilled, the participation effect
dominatesthehours-of-workeffect,whereasthelatterdominatesforthetwootherskill
groups. The participation effect is largest for the low skilled because in this group,
participation is lowest from the start, hence there are considerably more indiviuals left
who can be activated by higher labour supply incentives.
Next, we take a look at wages and unemployment rates. Figure 7 shows the change
in skill-speciﬁc wages. The wage reaction to tax progressivity is characteristically dif-
ferent depending on the skill group. The wage of the high skilled increases, whereas
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Fig. 6 Participation effects by skill group
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Fig. 7 Wage changes by skill group
the medium skilled and particularly the low skilled suffer a wage drop. It is not possi-
ble to infer the causal direction of the interaction between the labour market variables
from a simple inspection of the ﬁgures. However, the skill-speciﬁc wage reactions
may be interpreted as a consequence of the changes in labour supply (Fig. 4), which
are attenuated, but not reversed, by the wage changes.
Figure8showsunemploymentforthemediumandlowskilled.(Thehighskilledare
fully employed by assumption.) The ﬁgure reveals that the unemployment reaction is
almost linear and almost proportional to initial unemployment rates. Since for the low
skilled the initial unemployment rate (22%) is far higher than for the medium skilled
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Fig. 8 Unemployment by skill group
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Fig. 9 Total labour input (weighted hours)
(7%), unemployment changes, when measured in percentage points, are highest in
this segment as well.
Finally, we turn to total labour input to production. Given that we have changes
both in labour supply and unemployment—which is the overall effect on labour input
(in wage-weighted hours)? Of particular interest are the medium skilled (the largest
group),wherebothlaboursupplyandunemploymentaredecreasing,sothattheoverall
effect is unclear. Figure 9 shows that the net effect for the medium skilled is positive
and slightly increasing in tax progressivity. Labour input of the low skilled increases
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Fig. 10 Lump-sum transfer to balance public budget
considerably, whereas it falls for the high skilled. A wage-weighted average of all
labour-input changes (bold line “total”) almost precisely coincides with the curve for
the medium skilled, with an increase that remains below half a per cent.
Figure 10 shows the transfer that is paid to compensate the wage income recipients
for the higher marginal wage tax (so that the public budget is kept in balance). This
transfer increases almost linearly with the change of the marginal tax rate to more
than 200 euros per month. As a benchmark, a linear extrapolation of the change at
the ﬁrst one per cent increase is depicted in Fig. 10 as “Transfer (linear)”. The actual
transfer is slightly less than linear, and it turns out to be exactly this deviation that
leads to the welfare maximum in the model. At an 11-percentage-point increase of
the marginal tax rate, the deviation from the linear development is approximately 5
euros per month, in the region of the welfare maximum, it is approximately 1 euro per
month.
How is it possible to proceed from the observation of non-linear model reactions to
the identiﬁcation of the driving forces? In order to ﬁnd out the causal direction of the
effects, I run a number of diagnostic scenarios. First, I implement the line “Transfer
(linear)”fromFig.10asascenario,i.e.Icompensateindividualswiththelinearextrap-
olationoftheﬁrstincrementaltransfer,neglectingthebudgetconstraint.Inthissimula-
tionthewelfaremaximumdisappears(atleastwithintheregioncovered),and,instead,
welfare increases monotonously with tax progressivity. This identiﬁes the non-linear-
ity in the transfer as a crucial element in the determination of the welfare maximum.
What then is the cause of the non-linearity in the transfer? The next identiﬁca-
tion step is to check whether the initial impulse comes from the micro or the macro
part of the model. The second diagnostic scenario therefore consists in linearising the
macro module, by feeding the linear reactions of wages (Fig. 7) and unemployment
(Fig. 8) back into the micro module. This does not eliminate the non-linear reactions
oflaboursupply(Fig.4).Incontrast,whenIlinearisethemicromoduleandfeedlinear
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reactions in labour supply (Figs. 5, 6) back into the macro module, the non-linearities
in wages and transfers almost entirely disappear. This identiﬁes the micro module as
the source of the initial effect.
With regard to the labour supply reactions produced by the micro module (Figs. 5,
6), we have already found participation (Fig. 6) to be the dominating factor. How can
we explain that participation—while increasing monotonously for all skill groups—
increases less than linearly? The reason lies in the probability distribution assumed
in the logit labour supply model. The individual, unobservable utility components
of the different labour supply options—here we focus on the option “non-participa-
tion”—are extreme-value distributed. The extreme-value distribution is, similar to the
normal distribution, single-peaked, and its density decreases the greater the distance
from zero. Small changes in the attractiveness of one labour supply option will thus
have a larger effect when they are close to the initial situation (at zero) than when they
are farther away. This is the non-linearity that eventually drives the results.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
In the sensitivity analysis of the results, I vary the basic model set-up in three places:
elasticity of labour supply, elasticity of the wage curve with respect to tax progressiv-
ity, and international capital mobility. The ﬁrst two of these variations are backed up
with straightforward economic intuitions. When labour supply becomes more elastic,
we expect the welfare loss through labour supply distortions to increase and thus tax
progressivity to become less attractive. Conversely, when the wage curve reacts more
sensitivelytohighertaxprogressivity,thecontributionoftaxprogressivitytoreducing
labour market distortions resulting from collective wage bargaining is more signifi-
cant, and tax progressivity becomes more attractive. In Sects. 6.1 and 6.2 I investigate
whetherthemodelresultsconﬁrmtheseintuitions,andwhatthismeansinquantitative
terms. In Sect. 6.3, I turn to the degree of international capital mobility, which has
provedtobeanimportantdrivingforceoftheresultsinearlierapplicationsofPACE-L
(see Boeters and Feil 2009). In this case, we have no a priori expectation about the
direction of the effect, however.
6.1 Variation in Labour Supply Elasticities
Theelasticityoflaboursupplyisanobviouscandidateforsensitivityanalysis,because
it governs the distortions in labour supply, which constitute one side of the trade-off
we are exploring. However, the elasticity of labour supply is not a single parameter in
the model that could easily be varied. Rather, it results from the interaction of all indi-
vidual parameters in the utility functions, which determine the relative attractiveness
of leisure versus consumption. None of these parameters can easily be singled out for
variation.
As a practical solution, I vary all parameters that are connected with leisure in
the utility functions (linear, quadratic and interaction terms with other variables) with
the same multiplier. It turns out that this almost exactly translates into proportional
changes of labour supply elasticities. A multiplier of 0.9 leads to approximately 10%
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Table 1 Labour supply elasticities
Participation Hours of work
Low Base High Low Base High
elast. case elast. elast. case elast.
Singles 0.045 0.051 0.055 0.011 0.012 0.013
Low skilled 0.068 0.076 0.084 0.007 0.010 0.011
Medium skilled 0.046 0.052 0.056 0.011 0.013 0.014
High skilled 0.021 0.024 0.025 0.010 0.012 0.013
W o m e ni nc o u p l e s 0 .056 0.060 0.066 0.025 0.028 0.030
Low skilled 0.047 0.046 0.054 0.008 0.009 0.008
Medium skilled 0.053 0.059 0.064 0.027 0.029 0.032
High skilled 0.086 0.096 0.106 0.047 0.052 0.057
Men in couples 0.026 0.029 0.032 0.006 0.007 0.008
Low skilled 0.042 0.046 0.053 0.004 0.006 0.007
Medium skilled 0.028 0.032 0.034 0.006 0.007 0.008
High skilled 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009
All 0.040 0.044 0.048 0.013 0.015 0.016
Low skilled 0.052 0.056 0.064 0.007 0.008 0.009
Medium skilled 0.041 0.046 0.050 0.013 0.015 0.016
High skilled 0.028 0.031 0.034 0.017 0.019 0.021
lower labour supply elasticities (columns “Low elast.” in Table 1), a multiplier of 1.1
to elasticities that are 10% higher than in the base case (columns “High elast.”).6
Figure 11 shows the welfare effects. As expected, the lower labour supply elastici-
ties, the higher welfare gains from higher tax progressivity, with corresponding shifts
of the welfare maximum. When labour supply elasticities are low, maximum welfare
is reached at marginal tax rates that are 10percentage points higher than in the initial
situation, when elasticities are high, the maximum is at tax rates that are 5percentage
points higher.7
Figures 12 and 13 show the actions of the underlying labour market variables. For
the largest group, the medium skilled, effects are clear-cut. With higher labour supply
elasticity,thenegativelaboursupplyeffectsofthebasecaseareampliﬁed,whichleads
toahigherwage.Forthelowandhighskilled(whichareconsiderablysmallergroups),
the patterns are less clear-cut. There is hardly any change in low skilled labour supply
and high skilled wages, due to interaction effects with the other skill groups.
In the sensitivity analysis, labour supply elasticities have only been varied in a
narrow range (±10%), less than the variation that can be found in empirical esti-
mates. This restriction was deliberate, since I wanted to keep the welfare maximum in
6 Labour supply elasticities have been simulated by increasing all gross wages simultaneously by 10%
and then aggregating over individual discrete reactions. Interaction effects are very small, thus this yields
almost the same results as varying wages separately group by group.
7 The calculations in the sensitivity analysis are based on simulations with 100 sets of random error terms.
For this purpose, a set is chosen that produces aggregate results similar to the extended 1,000-error-terms
set in Sect. 5. Nevertheless, curve “ELS = mid” in Fig. 11 does not exactly coincide with the one in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 11 Varying labour supply elasticity: welfare
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Fig. 12 Varying labour supply elasticity: labour supply
the range covered by the simulations of the base case. Further simulations conﬁrmed
what can be expected by extrapolating from Fig. 11. If labour supply elasticities are
even lower, then the welfare effect is monotonously increasing over the full range of
marginal tax rates, if they are higher, the curve is monotonously decreasing.
6.2 Variation in Wage Curve Elasticities
Similar to the case of labour supply elasticities, we can make an informed guess
aboutwhatwouldhappenifthewagebargainingsystem(representedbywagecurves)
reacted more or less sensitively to a variation of tax progressivity. As the positive
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Fig. 13 Varying labour supply elasticity: wage
effect of tax progressivity is reducing unemployment by exerting downward pressure
on wages, the welfare effects of tax progressivity are expected to be the more positive,
the more sensitively the wages react.
However, again similar to the case of labour supply elasticities, there is no free
parameter in the model that directly governs the responsiveness of the wage to varia-
tions in tax progressivity (or other institutional parameters). The latter is the result of
the integrated wage bargaining system, whose only parameter, the relative bargaining
power of the trade unions, has been ﬁxed in the calibration so that the actual level of
unemployment is met. There is no other parameter that could be varied to systemati-
cally modify the responsiveness of the wage bargaining system to changes in labour
market conditions.
In this sensitivity analysis, I use a modelling shortcut and make the bargaining
strength parameter a linear function of tax progressivity. In the “high elasticity”
(“EWC=high”) scenario, bargaining strength of the trade union decreases in tax pro-
gressivity,sothatthewagedropsmorethaninthebasecasewithaconstantbargaining
parameter (and vice versa for the “low elasticity” scenario). The linear parameter is
chosen so that in the high (low) elasticity scenario the responsiveness of the wage
curve to tax progressivity is 25% higher (lower) than in the base case. The result-
ing wage curve elasticities (per cent change in wages as a reaction to a 1 percentage
point increase of the marginal tax rate, holding average taxes constant) are shown in
Table 2.8
Welfarereactstothesevariationsinwagecurveelasticitiesasexpected(seeFig.14).
With more (less) elastic wage curves, the welfare gains of additional tax progressiv-
ity are higher (lower). For the values chosen in the sensitivity analysis, optimal tax
8 These elasticities have been simulated as general equilibrium reactions to a 1percentage point increase
of the marginal tax rates at ﬁxed labour supply (but all other economic variables endogenously adjusting).
As there is no wage bargaining for the high skilled, they are excluded from the table.
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Table 2 Wage curve elasticities Low Base High
elast. case elast.
Low skilled −0.233 −0.311 −0.389
Medium skilled −0.179 −0.239 −0.299
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Fig. 14 Varying wage curve elasticity: welfare
progression turns out to be at 8 percentage points (higher elasticity) and 5 percentage
points (lower elasticity) above the initial level.
In the case of wage curve elasticities, the core labour market variables closely fol-
lowthevariationinthewagecurve. Higherwagecurveelasticitiestranslateintolower
wages and higher employment for both the medium and low skilled. Again, the range
of variation in the elasticity values is chosen deliberately so that the maxima of the
welfare curve remain within the range covered by the numerical simulations. Higher
(lower)elasticityvaluesoutsidethisrangeleadtoawelfarecurvethatismonotonously
increasing (decreasing).
6.3 Variation in International Capital Mobility
In contrast to labour supply and wage curve elasticities, international capital mobil-
ity is not directly linked to the mechanisms that determine optimal tax progressivity.
Therefore,wehavenoclearhypothesisinwhichdirectionachangeincapitalmobility
woulddrivetheresults.FromothersimulationswithPACE-L(BoetersandFeil2009),
however, we know that international capital mobility is in fact important to the out-
comes. In addition, this mechanism is particularly suited to demonstrate the general
usefulness of the linkage approach. The role of capital mobility would not be taken
into account if we limited ourselves to a partial labour market approach.
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Fig. 15 Varying capital mobility:welfare
In the base case of Sect. 5, international capital mobility is calibrated to empirical
parameters from French and Poterba (1991) and de Mooij and Ederveen (2001). The
core parameter is the elasticity of foreign capital supply with respect to the domestic
interest rate (“ECS”), which is set to 2.4. Figure 15 shows the welfare effects of the
policy reform for the base case and two variants, where capital supply elasticity is
varied by 25% around its base value (“ECS=1.8” and “ECS=3.0” respectively). It
turns out that the welfare maximum shifts to the right with increasing capital mobility.
With low international capital mobility (“ECS=1.8”), the maximum is at +4%-p.,
with high capital mobility (“ECS=3.0”) at +9%-p.9
Why is an increase in tax progressivity more favourable when the degree of inter-
national capital mobility is high? To understand this effect, one must recall from Sect.
5 that higher tax progressivity increases total labour input in the economy (Fig. 9).
Higher labour input means—complications due to the different substitutability of the
skill groups with capital aside—more attractive conditions for internationally mobile
capital, which is reﬂected in an increasing rental rate of capital. The more mobile
capital internationally, the more these attractive conditions translate into an increase
in the domestic capital stock and the more is the increase in the rental rate attenuated
(Fig. 16).
Thedifferencesininternationalcapitalinﬂowtranslateintodifferencesintheresult-
ingwages(seeFig.17),whichinturndrivethewelfareresults.Thelargesteffect,which
also dominates the welfare changes, is on the wage of the high skilled. The wage of
the medium skilled is virtually unaffected, while the wage of the low skilled, who
are substitutes with capital rather than complements, are even slightly decreasing in
capital mobility.
9 I also ran scenarios with even lower or higher elasticities. Then there is no more inner maximum in the
range covered by the simulations, and we have a monotonous welfare curve instead.
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Fig. 16 Varying capital mobility: return to capital
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Fig. 17 Varying capital mobility: wages
7 Conclusions
What is the optimal degree of income tax progressivity when both labour supply and
wagesareendogenous,andhouseholdsareheterogeneousinseveraldimensions?This
questionisansweredusinganumericalcombinedmicro-macromodel.Themicropart
features approximately 4,600 individual households with varying wages and labour
supply reactions. The macro part includes sectoral collective wage bargaining and
involuntary unemployment. Thus the fundamental trade-off created by increasing tax
progressivityiscaptured. Ontheonehand, higher marginal taxrates distortindividual
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labour supply. On the other hand, higher tax progressivity has a wage-moderating and
unemployment-reducing effect under collective wage bargaining.
In this general setting, varying tax progressivity is implemented as a stepwise one-
percentage-point increase of the marginal wage income tax and a compensating trans-
fer to all working individuals, which keeps the public budget balanced. The most
important simulation results are the following:
• A welfare maximum is reached at a point where marginal income tax rates are
6percentage points above the initial level.
• The welfare gain at this point averages a moderate two euros per household and
per month.
• This average welfare gain is overshadowed by considerable redistributive effects,
which range from a loss of more than 300 euros to a gain of almost 200 euros.
• Labour supply effects of higher tax progressivity are positive at the participation
margin and negative at the hours-of-work margin. The net effect varies by skill
group; it is positive for the low skilled, but negative for the medium and high
skilled.
• At the same time higher tax progressivity reduces the unemployment rate. This
effect dominates, so that overall labour input to production (in wage-weighted
hours of work) increases.
These results have been subject to a sensitivity analysis in three dimensions:
• The more elastic the labour supply, the lower the optimal degree of tax progressiv-
ity. This is plausible because, with higher elasticity of labour supply, the distortive
effect of higher tax progressivity at the hours-of-work margin is larger.
• The more elastic the wage curve with respect to the marginal tax rates, the higher
theoptimaldegreeoftaxprogressivity.Ifthewagecurvereactsstronglytothemar-
ginal tax rate, higher tax progressivity has a large corrective effect on the labour
marketdistortioncausedbywagesabovemarketclearing,whichincreaseswelfare.
• Themoremobilecapitalisinternationally,thehighertheoptimaldegreeoftaxpro-
gressivity. This is because higher tax progressivity attracts capital to the domestic
market, the more so the higher capital mobility.
Giventhesmallsizeoftheaveragewelfareeffect(twoeurosperhouseholdpermonth),
theresultscancertainlynotbeinterpretedassupportingastrongefﬁciency-basedclaim
in favour of more tax progressivity. It makes more sense to interpret the results the
other way round: Since the average efﬁciency effects are that small, there is scope for
distributional considerations. Whatever distributional goal the government or a par-
ticular political party tries to attain by an adjustment of tax progressivity, they are not
likely to be overridden by efﬁciency effects that put public budget balance in danger.
This conclusion is warranted within the range covered by the simulations, i.e. from
the current degree of progressivity up to marginal tax rates for all individuals that are
roughly 10percentage points higher than the current ones.
Although the model of this paper has been designed to contain the features most
relevant to an assessment of tax progressivity, some aspects have not been covered.
These must be kept in mind when interpreting the results. First and foremost, the
model, while lending itself to a descriptive distributional analysis, does not allow for
123470 S. Boeters
distributive weighting in the welfare function. This is because welfare weights can-
not be set non-arbitrarily as long as we have incommensurable utility functions per
household. (See the discussion at the end of Sect. 3.)
Second, there are only relatively few labour supply options in the discrete-choice
set-up(amaximumofﬁveoptionsperindividual).Theeffectofthenumberofoptions
ontheresultsisnotclear-cut(seeAabergeetal.2006).However,onemightconjecture
that more and ﬁner labour supply options facilitate the switching from one option to
another, because the critical utility differential necessary for a switch is lower. This
might aggravate the distortionary effects on labour supply. On the other hand, with
only a few options the effect conditional on the less likely switch is larger, hence the
difﬁculty to draw general conclusions.
Finally,comparing themodel withthereal situationinGermany in2005, thematch
is not perfect. In 2005, we had a uniform income tax for all types of income. In
contrast, the simulations assume that the change in income tax progressivity applies
only to labour income. Given the set-up of the model, this is a reasonable assump-
tion. The model is not suited to analyse the effects of capital income tax changes,
because it does not include the long-run effects on domestic capital formation. Ana-
lysing such effects would require a model as presented by Conesa et al. (2009). As a
historical coincidence, the 2008 Business Tax Reform (becoming effective in 2009,
see Homburg 2007) introduced a ﬂat tax for non-business investment income, which
makes the actual tax system much more similar to the dual income tax of this paper
than it was in 2005.
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Appendix
A.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3, 4.
A.2 Estimation Results from the Microsimulation Model
Table 5, 6, 7.
Table 3 Discrete weekly working hours by household types
Individual Hours options
Men, married or single without children 0 38 49
Men, single with children 0 15 30 38 49
Women, single 0 15 30 38 49
Women, married 0 9.5 24 38 47
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Table 4 Characteristics of skill groups in GSOEP
Low Medium High
skilleda skilled skilleda All
Number of individuals 854 3,016 761 4,631
Share in dataset, unweighted (%) 18.44 65.13 16.43 100.00
Share in dataset, weighted (%) 15.82 68.24 15.94 100.00
Singles
Share in skill group, weighted (%) 38.16 32.88 37.96 34.52
W o m e ni nc o u p l e s
Share in skill group, weighted (%) 37.49 33.89 23.09 32.74
Men in couples
Share in skill group, weighted (%) 24.35 33.23 38.95 32.74
Participation
Participation rate, weighted (%) 70.71 79.97 91.25 80.30
Share in total participation, weighted (%) 13.93 67.95 18.12 100.00
Average hours per worker, weighted 35.55 37.55 39.87 37.69
Share in total hours, weighted (%) 13.14 67.70 19.16 100.00
Average gross wage per hour, weighted (euros) 11.70 13.38 18.37 14.12
Share in total wage bill, weighted (%) 10.89 64.17 24.93 100.00
a“Low skilled”: no formal education completed, “high skilled”: tertiary education completed
Table 5 Maximum likelihood estimates for single females
Coef. SE z P > z
Net household income −6.44 1.85 −3.48 0.001
Net household incomeˆ20 .43 0.08 5.22 0.000
Net hh income×leisure 0.48 0.30 1.63 0.103
Leisure×East Germany −0.96 0.29 −3.32 0.001
Leisure×nationality 0.23 0.41 0.57 0.566
Leisure 77.59 14.10 5.50 0.000
Leisureˆ2 −9.96 1.80 −5.55 0.000
Leisure×age −1.11 0.31 −3.65 0.000
Leisure×ageˆ20 .10 0.04 2.42 0.016
Leisureˆ2×age 0.59 0.12 4.83 0.000
Leisure×handicapped −0.17 0.90 −0.18 0.853
Leisure×children < 6 years 4.99 0.60 8.32 0.000
Leisure×children 7–16 years 1.50 0.35 4.29 0.000
Leisure×children ≥ 17 years −0.48 0.31 −1.53 0.127
Dummy for employment −2.13 0.25 −8.67 0.000
Number of obs. 540
Log likelihood −636.0
Conditional logit with ﬁve hours-of-work options (0, 15, 30, 38, 49), GSOEP 1999
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Table 6 Maximum likelihood estimates for single males
Coef. SE z P > z
Net household income 6.76 2.73 2.48 0.013
Net household incomeˆ2 −0.019 0.10 −0.19 0.848
Net hh income×leisure −1.42 0.44 −3.21 0.001
Leisure 169.71 20.03 8.47 0.000
Leisureˆ2 −21.13 2.60 −8.12 0.000
Leisure×East Germany −0.05 0.33 −0.15 0.881
Leisure×nationality 0.29 0.48 0.60 0.547
Leisure×age −0.74 0.32 −2.34 0.019
Leisure×ageˆ20 .41 0.12 3.35 0.001
Leisureˆ2×age 0.06 0.04 1.46 0.143
Leisure×handicapped 1.32 0.83 1.60 0.110
Dummy for employment −9.96 1.13 −8.78 0.000
Number of obs. 952
Log likelihood −1286.7
Conditional logit with ﬁve hours-of-work options (0, 15, 30, 38, 49), GSOEP 1999
Table 7 Maximum likelihood estimates for couples
Coef. SE z P > z
Net household income 8.95 5.11 1.75 0.080
Net household incomeˆ2 −0.003 0.26 −0.01 0.989
Net hh income×leisure of male spouse −1.46 0.42 −3.46 0.001
Net hh income×leisure of female spouse −0.43 0.38 −1.14 0.253
Net hh income×nationality −6.92 3.82 −1.81 0.070
Net hh incomeˆ2×nationality 0.56 0.27 2.09 0.036
Net hh income×East Germany 5.50 1.87 2.94 0.003
Net hh incomeˆ2×East Germany −0.49 0.14 −3.37 0.001
Leisure of male spouse 56.72 7.15 7.94 0.000
Leisure of male spouseˆ2 −4.06 0.47 −8.66 0.000
Leisure of male spouse×nationality −0.40 0.41 −0.98 0.328
Leisure of male spouse×East Germany −6.05 2.80 −2.16 0.031
Leisure of male spouse×age −0.36 0.08 −4.31 0.000
Leisure of male spouse×ageˆ20 .48 0.10 4.99 0.000
Leisure of male spouse×handicapped 0.76 0.72 1.06 0.290
Leisure of female spouse 79.98 7.00 11.43 0.000
Leisure of female spouseˆ2 −8.40 0.53 −15.77 0.000
Leisure of female spouse×nationality 0.27 0.40 0.67 0.501
Leisure of female spouse×East Germany −7.10 2.59 −2.74 0.006
Leisure of female spouse×age −0.39 0.09 −4.18 0.000
Leisure of female spouse×ageˆ20 .58 0.11 5.26 0.000
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Table 7 continued
Coef. SE z P > z
Leisure of female spouse× handicapped 0.97 0.71 1.36 0.175
Leisure of female spouse×children < 6 years 4.63 0.31 14.98 0.000
Leisure of female spouse×children 7–16 years 2.13 0.22 9.59 0.000
Leisure of female spouse×children ≥ 17 years −0.56 0.22 −2.56 0.011
Leisure of male spouse×Leisure of female spouse −1.50 0.55 −2.72 0.006
Leisure of male spouse
× Leisure of female spouse×nationality 0.26 0.14 1.78 0.075
Leisure of male spouse
× Leisure of female spouse×East Germany 1.03 0.70 1.47 0.142
Dummy for employment of female spouse −2.55 0.25 −10.09 0.000
Dummy for employment of both spouses 0.61 0.24 2.54 0.011
Number of obs. 1910
Log likelihood −4186.1
Conditional logit with ﬁfteen hours-of-work options (female spouse: 0, 9.5, 24, 38, 47; male spouse: 0, 38,
49), GSOEP 1999
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